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Youth in Tunisia: 
Trapped Between Public Control and the Neo-Liberal Economy
Maria Cristina Paciello, Renata Pepicelli and Daniela Pioppi1
Abstract
“Youth” has been a category of public action in Tunisia ever since the country achieved its 
independence, although the discourse, values and policies associated with it have changed 
following the different phases of the country’s political economy. The paper provides an 
analysis of relevant youth policies in four interrelated domains of public action, with a focus 
on the period since the 90s: family, employment, migration and spatial planning policies.
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1. YOUTH POLICY IN TUNISIA: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
“Youth” has been a category of public action in Tunisia ever since the country achieved its 
independence, although the discourse, values and policies associated with it have changed 
following the different phases of the country’s political economy.
In post-independence Tunisia, “youth” embodied the new spirit of modernization and social 
progress embedded in the national building project. Youth, meaning educated urban youth, 
had a positive role to play in the transformation of society.2 In this respect, education 
represented the supreme value and the main vehicle of social mobility (Ben Romdhane 
2011:177). Public efforts focused on enhancing and expanding public education and creating 
new jobs, as well as encouraging a “demographic revolution” through a progressive family 
code (promulgated in 1956) and active family planning policies, in the attempt to address the 
high levels of illiteracy, unemployment, the phenomenon of early marriage and high birth 
rates in the country (Charrad 2001, Ben Romdhane 2006 and 2011:153, 157).
In the 50s and 60s, Tunisia developed a labour-centred social system that is a social security 
system jointly financed by employers and employees through payroll deduction (Catusse et 
al 2010, Ben Romdhane 2006). The system worked well as the salaried population increased 
rapidly after independence, mainly through public sector expansion.
The welfare system was also central to the strategies of political legitimation of the new 
elites and regime consolidation. In an attempt to neutralize dissent, then President Bourguiba 
made use of repressive measures, but also co-opted political mobilization in state-sponsored 
organizations such as, for youth, the Union générale des étudiants de Tunisie. In the context of 
1 Maria Cristina Paciello and Daniela Pioppi are Senior Fellows at the Mediterranean and Middle East Programme 
of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the coordinators of Power2Youth. Renata Pepicelli is Associate 
Research Fellow for Power2Youth at the IAI.
2 Similarly to what happened in other countries. For more information, see Neyzi (2005) and Bennani-Chraïbi and 
Farag (2007).
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a single party system and state corporatism, the social pact based on the state’s commitment 
to full employment for educated youth was instrumental to limit social conflicts and youth 
political dissent: in exchange for regime loyalty, youth were provided with education, 
employment opportunities and social mobility.
However, starting in the 70s – and more so in the following decades – the regime gradually 
began to change its macroeconomic policies in line with the global neo-liberal orthodoxy, 
thus undermining the post-independence social pact (Ben Romdhane 2006). Especially after 
the first Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986, the regime resolutely pursued 
market-oriented policies by expanding trade agreements and implementing privatization 
programmes (which underwent an acceleration in the 2000s when they were extended to 
the telecommunication and bank sectors). As in other countries, the new macroeconomic 
policies were aimed at attracting foreign investments by also pushing competitiveness 
through lowering the cost of labour and increasing employment flexibility. In addition, with 
the progressive withdrawal of the state from social welfare provisions, the prospects for 
stable employment in the public sector declined significantly since the mid-1990s, causing a 
slowdown in public sector hiring and the widespread of contract-based jobs in the Tunisian 
economy (Destremau 2010:160, Hibou 2006, Meddeb 2012).
The reorientation of the economy toward a neo-liberal free market model and the significant 
decline in the offer of stable employment in the public sector owing to cuts in state expenses, 
had the cost of an exponential growth of unemployment, especially for first insertion in the job 
market (more than loss of jobs). There was also a general increase of informal temporary and 
low-paid jobs, coupled with growing social and regional inequalities especially with respect to 
access to employment and public services.
In this second phase of the country’s political economy, the regime pursued different strategies 
to mitigate and conceal the negative social effects of its new economic course besides the 
well-known repressive police state expanded by Ben Ali (Hibou 2006).
For instance, with respect to other countries under SAPs, Tunisia maintained – or even 
extended – its social policies until the beginning of the first decade of the 2000s, which 
continued to be the backbone of the regime’s political legitimacy, although at the price of 
a deterioration of quality.3 Moreover, to mitigate the social costs (and potential political 
conflicts) of increasing inequalities, a number of new social programmes were also launched 
in the 1990s and 2000s, mainly as poverty-alleviating measures with the identification of 
special social categories in need of intervention (such as poor women and youth living in poor 
regions). In 1992, the National Solidarity Fund (Fonds de solidarité nationale known as 26-26, 
the number of the bank account) was created to lead the fight against poverty, aimed at both 
the “zones d’ombre” (dark zones) and the part of the population not covered by the social 
security system (Hibou 2006).
3 Social security was expanded to include most categories of salaried and non-salaried workers (see, for instance, 
the law on social security in 2002 (Destremau 2010). In 1991, major education reform (also aimed at eradicating 
Islamist “culture”) coincided with sustained public funding compared to other countries, albeit at the cost of 
deteriorating quality (Ben Romdhane 2011).
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The apparent strength of the Tunisian welfare system, combined with the widespread public 
discourse of a Tunisian “economic miracle” in the 1990s, created the myth of a Tunisian 
“exception”, or of an adjustment “à visage humain”, also shared by Tunisia’s international 
donors and main trade partners (World Bank, IMF, European Union, etc.), which greatly 
contributed to regime sustainability.
Starting in the 90s, there was a renewed attention to the category of youth in public discourse 
and action, as revealed by the relatively large amount of public resources devoted to job 
creation programmes for youth and by the proliferation of national tools and institutions 
in charge of implementing such programmes.4 In 1995, the National Council of Youth 
(Conseil national de la jeunesse) was created to assist the Ministry of Youth and Childhood in 
coordinating youth programmes, evaluating the conditions of youth in the country, dealing 
with all questions concerning youth and preparing a national strategy for the promotion of 
youth (Sraïeb 1997:803). In 2002, the National Youth Observatory (Observatoire national de 
la jeunesse, ONJ) was established with the aim of carrying out studies on youth and charting 
development plans through regular consultations (every 5 years) with youth-led and youth-
targeting associations.
While, in comparison to other countries (see, for example, Morocco), the Ben Ali regime tried 
to avoid public alarmism on the issue of youth unemployment and migration, which would 
have contrasted with the Tunisian “economic miracle” and success story, youth and youth-
associated problems (delinquency, marginalization, graduate unemployment) increasingly 
became axioms of public discourse when dealing with the country’s social problems. As in 
other contexts, the youth category had the advantage of portraying social marginalization 
as a residual consequence of the demographic bulge, rather than, for instance, as a product 
of concrete economic policies carried out by the regime, inasmuch as the undifferentiated 
category of youth helped to conceal issues of class inequalities and social conflict.
In official documents and discourse, the natural response to youth unemployment among 
graduates was the acceleration of the country’s integration into the international market and 
the promotion of a larger role for the private sector. The “presidential youth programme” of the 
11th Development Plan (2007-2011),5 which was centred specifically on employment, proposed 
to build partnership between companies and universities, encourage Internet business and 
self-employment, and facilitate youth access to work through associative networks (Tunisia 
2007). The growing stress on the need to increase youth education and skills, and on youth 
self-entrepreneurship, also had the advantage of placing the burden of youth labour market 
insertion on the youth themselves, rather than on the state.
At the same time, always in line with the state’s growing disengagement from its post-
independence social and economic regulatory functions, the regime adopted a tolerating 
4 In 2006, the budget devoted to employment creation represented about 0.8 percent of GDP, an indicator which 
is said to be near the upper limit of OECD countries in terms of active employment policies (from 0.2 to 1 percent) 
(Haouas et al 2012). Among the major institutions in the field of employment, there were: the Agence nationale 
de l’emploi et du travail indépendant (ANETI), the Direction générale de l’inspection du travail, the Banque 
tunisienne de solidarité (BTS), the Fond national de l’emploi (FNE 21-21) and the Agence tunisienne de formation 
professionnelle (ATEP).
5 See also 10th Development Plan (2002-2006) and 12th Development Plan (2010-2014) (Tunisia 2002 and 2010).
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attitude toward informal economic activities and illegal migration (at least until the early/
mid-2000s), which were playing a key labour-absorbing function vis-à-vis youth, particularly 
in poor urban areas and marginalized regions of the southwest and the centre west (Elbaz 
2009, Hibou et al 2011, Meddeb 2012).
Seen against the backdrop of the state’s neo-liberal macroeconomic policies, the proliferation 
of youth employment and social programmes carried out since the 90s represented at best 
mitigating or propaganda moves – or, as argued by Hibou et al. (2011), “dilatory policies” aimed 
at diminishing the number of unemployed youth in official statistics by registering youth for 
underpaid internships and programmes. In addition, these measures had the advantage of 
providing new modalities of control over the unsupervised young population, who were less 
and less attracted to join the youth section of the regime party. Access to youth employment 
programmes was thus conditional on political loyalty, as in the post-independence period 
(Hibou et al 2011:57), but the “carrot” provided by the regime in exchange for political 
acquiescence under Ben Ali was not a secure public employment job; instead, it was an 
underpaid temporary internship.
Notwithstanding the regime’s efforts, the myth of a successful Tunisian economic model 
capable of granting a constant growth, a diversification of the economy, constant job 
creation, the attraction of foreign investments and an increase in exports was more and 
more questioned in the 2000s (see Hibou 2006, Hibou et al 2011), as also demonstrated 
by the persistent flow of illegal migration among youth toward Europe, by growing popular 
unrest in the poorest regions (such as in the southern mining region of Gafsa, in Skhira in the 
southeast, and in Ben Gardane) since 2008 (Allal 2010) – and, of course, by the 2010-11 revolt 
which led to the fall of Ben Ali.
The 2010-2011 Tunisian “revolution” apparently represents a watershed in public discourse 
on “youth”, or better a real explosion of the category of youth at all levels of the public 
debate. It was, in fact, unanimously labelled as “youth revolution”, both domestically and 
internationally, and the day of Ben Ali’s departure from the country, the 14th of January, 
became the “revolution and youth day”. Youth became the keyword to understand both the 
root causes and the dynamics of the revolution, as well as the priority of the post-revolutionary 
political transition. A number of academic works and international agencies’ reports were 
published on youth-related issues including the revolutionary role of youth, youth creativity 
and youth needs and exclusion.6 In the political debate, “youth” came to embody dynamism 
and positive change, and the lively part of society that was repressed and mistreated under 
authoritarian rule. As an illustration of this, Article 8 of the new Constitution states:
Youth are an active force in building the nation. The state seeks to provide the necessary 
conditions for developing the capacities of youth and realizing their potential, supports 
them to assume responsibility, and strives to extend and generalize their participation 
in social, economic, cultural and political development.7
6 For example, the World Bank and the ILO, in partnership with Tunisian local authorities, carried out youth 
surveys for the first time in, respectively, 2012 and 2013 (World Bank 2014, ILO and Minister of Employment 2014).
7 An unofficial translation of the Tunisian Constitution adopted on 26 January 2014 is available here: http://www.
constitutionnet.org/files/2014.01.26_-_final_constitution_english_idea_final.pdf.
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In the post-uprising euphoria, the category of youth has been significantly stretched to include 
not only teenagers and people in their twenties, but also the population in their thirties and 
beyond; the revolutionary role of adults and adult-led organizations was generally downplayed 
in Tunisia and other “Arab spring” countries (Sukarieh and Tannock 2014:107). While “youth” 
became a synonym for the “marginalized” including not only (as in the pre-revolution period) 
“unemployed graduates [male]” but also “other socio-economic groups of youth” such as 
“young women and men from different backgrounds, especially from marginalized regions.” 
“Youth exclusion”, presented as a multidimensional concept embracing “economic, social, 
political, and cultural dimensions,” became the buzzword in official policy documents requiring 
the development of a “multidimensional youth inclusion policy” (World Bank 2014:xiii, x and 
xix-xx).
All of this enthusiasm for youth since 2011 brought a further multiplication of youth-targeting 
programmes and initiatives, mainly carried out through international cooperation and 
national NGOs. However, policy solutions to youth problems appear in full continuity with 
the past as they propose to reinforce neo-liberal policies that have proven to have negative 
implications in terms of raising inequalities and quality job creation. The persistence of 
protests in marginalized regions such as Sidi Bouzid, particularly by unemployed youth, as 
well as the phenomenon of irregular migration, show that structural problems are far from 
being addressed.
Also, parallel to the renewed positive narrative on youth, another discourse emerged in the 
post-revolutionary period, resonating with the previous regime’s discourse on unsupervised 
youth as a fertile ground for extremism and violence. This time, the negative construction 
of youth is applied to those Tunisian young volunteers to the Islamic State (Soufan Group 
2015), and those who support local terrorist groups (such as the ones who attacked the Bardo 
Museum on 18 March 2015), and more broadly to the continuing mobilization of unemployed 
youth in the marginalized regions. From revolutionary heroes, “excluded” youth are thus 
potential terrorists and troublemakers undermining national cohesion and the prospects for 
a bright future, reflecting the need of public authorities to restore order, stability and security. 
Again, the explosive social conflict caused by rising inequalities and a failed development 
model is reduced to a question of juvenile extremist nature and to the Islamist/non-Islamist 
cultural divide, which can be dealt with using a mix of repression and the preaching of 
tolerance through educational programmes.
The following paragraphs are devoted to a more in-depth analysis of youth-relevant policies in 
four interrelated domains of public action, with a focus on the period since Tunisia’s insertion 
in the neo-liberal economy: family, employment, migration and spatial planning policies. The 
first two domains more directly contribute to produce and define the category of youth, 
whereas the latter two interfere in a more subtle way in youth policies. However, all of them 
strongly affect “youth”, both in concrete terms and as a constructed category.
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2. YOUTH AND FAMILY
In Tunisia, as in the rest of the Arab world, the category of youth is constructed in relation 
to the institution of the family, which has gone through important transformations in the 
last 50 years as result of a series of family policies. Reforming the Tunisian family was after 
independence part and parcel of a larger state-building programme that aimed at developing 
a modern centralized state and at marginalizing patriarchal kin-based communities in local 
areas (Charrad 2001). At the heart of this ambitious project has been the Tunisian Code of 
Personal Status (CPS). Promulgated on 13 August 1956, in the aftermath of independence from 
French colonial rule, and amended in 1993,8 it constituted a radical shift in the interpretation of 
Islamic laws with regard to the family (Charrad 2001). It abolished polygamy and the husband’s 
right to repudiate his wife while it allowed women to get a divorce. Furthermore the CPS raised 
the minimum marriage age to 15 years for women and 18 for men, thus reducing significantly 
the phenomenon of early marriage. According to the 2011-2012 Multiple Indicators Cluster 
Survey (MICS4), only 0.4 percent of women aged 15-49 were married before the age of 15, 
and 5.1 percent were married before the legal age of 18 (UNICEF 2013).
In addition to the CPS, the Tunisian government launched in the 1960s an intense family 
planning programme, which was a forerunner in the region (Robinson and Ross 2007, Ben 
Romdhane 2011). It included the spread of contraceptives, an abortion law (1965 for health 
reasons, 1973 for woman’s choice) and a network of family planning centres. The fertility 
rates lowered accordingly from 7.5 children per woman in the second half of the 1950s to 2 
in 2005.9
Family planning policies and the CPS still regulate Tunisian society,10 representing the backbone 
of family policies. The Code represents in fact an element of continuity from Bourguiba to Ben 
Ali and also to the “post-revolutionary” period 2011-2014. The revolutionary process and the 
emergence of the Islamist party, al-Nahda, on the Tunisian political scene has not actually 
altered the logic behind family policies notwithstanding different – more conservative – 
narratives emerging on gender relations.11 Article 21 of the Constitution approved in January 
2014 states the equality between men and women without any discrimination.
However although the family structure has strongly changed since independence and 
although Tunisian women have undergone significant social improvements in terms of access 
to education, health and lower fertility rates, the “cultural meaning of adulthood is still defined 
8 In 1993, for the first time a Tunisian woman could pass her nationality to a child born abroad, regardless of the 
nationality of the child’s father.
9 However recent studies testify a counter demographic transition after the Arab uprisings in Tunisia. Since 2014 
Tunisia, as other countries in the Middle East and North African region, has experienced a marked increase in the 
birth rate. However Youssef Courbage, research director at the National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED), 
does not foresee this growth as being sustainable and believes that the countries in the region will eventually 
return to limited fertility in a short time. See Mohsen-Finan (2015).
10 It’s worth underlining that outside Tunis and the big cities in the North the CPS had minor impact. According to 
Andrea Khalil, in the southern regions of Tunisia many women live according to a set of customary laws that are 
distinct from the CPS (Khalil 2014:53). Under Ben Ali this reality was neglected and dissimulated by the discourse 
of women’s liberation depicted by “state feminism”, which used women’s rights as a tool for political legitimacy.
11 See, for instance, the proposal by some members of Ennahda in August 2012 to insert in the Constitutional text 
the issue of “complementarity” between men and women rather than “equality”.
9Working Paper No. 6 - February 2016
Youth in Tunisia
by marriage” (Singerman 2007:8). Marriage is still considered the moment of transition from 
youth to adulthood, both for women and men, even if for the latter getting married requires 
first finding employment. However, currently a delay in marriage characterizes the life of 
many youth.
Since the 1990s-2000s, the progressive reorientation of the Tunisian economy toward a neo-
liberal free market economy, incapable of creating job opportunities for young people and 
generating low-paid and precarious employment, has contributed to the delay of marriage 
and family formation, thus questioning the normative model of adulthood transition. A 
survey carried out by the Office national de la famille et de la population (ONFP) under 
Ben Ali confirms that the economic dimension is central to explaining the postponement of 
marriage: among the reasons mentioned by young people were wedding fees (34 percent), 
unemployment (22 percent) and difficulties in finding accommodation (22 percent) (ONFP 
2010). Many young people in Tunisia, as in the rest of the Middle East, remain single for long 
periods of time while trying to save money to marry, but with poor labour market outcomes 
the financial investment in marriage takes years to accumulate (Singerman 2007, Dhillon et 
al 2009).
Today, the age at which an individual is first married has undergone a significant and often 
involuntary delay, both for women and for men, resulting in an expansion of youth status 
until 30 years and beyond. According to a population census of 1966, the average marriage 
age for Tunisian women was 19.5 and 26.3 for men, which increased respectively to 27.1 and 
32.4 in 2007 (ONFP 2010) in a social context in which celibacy has become more and more 
important (see UNICEF 2008 and 2013). According to data provided by the ONFP (2010), in 
2001 15 percent of women between 35-39 and 20 percent of men of the same age group were 
not married. For women aged 40-44, celibacy was higher than for men (9 percent compared 
to 5.7 percent for men).
While youth have increasingly delayed marriage and family formation, public discourse and 
action in Tunisia have continued to sustain the normative model of adulthood – according to 
which forming a family within legal marriage signals the passage to adulthood – with negative 
consequences on the lives and expectations of young people.
The postponement of marriage has prolonged the material dependence of youth on their family 
of origin. The period of time before being able to marry can be even longer for young people 
dependent on poor families. It is worth mentioning that the family is taking a new centrality at 
a time when neo-liberal policies are threatening state support toward this institution. In fact, 
under Ben Ali, family allowances saw a decline and were only provided to members belonging 
to the social security system, thus excluding poor families with dependents (Ben Romdhane 
2006, Destremau 2010:162). At the same time, the growing importance of the family of origin 
in youth transition to adulthood provides a minimum safety-net, and allows authoritarian 
regimes to preserve the status quo and exercise control over young people by containing 
their anger against the regime. However, this comes at the cost of exacerbating frustration 
and intergenerational resentment, increasing illegal migration or drug abuse (Singerman 
2007:37).
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Moreover, in a social context requiring that the individual marries and constitutes his/her 
family in order to be considered a full adult citizen, involuntary delayed marriage is a barrier 
to full inclusion in the normatively defined system (Khoury and Lopez 2011:24, Dhillon et al 
2009), particularly for women. As families outside of the marriage bond are not recognized, 
there is no space for forms of families that occur outside legal marriage. Those who fall 
outside the dominant model of family (such as unmarried heterosexual couples or LGBTQ 
individuals) have been subject to sanctions and other negative consequences. The case of 
the growing number of single mothers, mostly young women, who are often abandoned even 
by the family of origin, is a case in point (Sbouaï 2012). In this regard, Tunisian authorities 
under Ben Ali did not provide any kind of support for these women and their children, even 
if by law the potential father has to submit himself to a test to establish paternity and, once 
recognized as the natural father, has to pay a cheque to support the child. In the post-uprising 
period, the social stigma continues to be very high, and is reinforced by some political parties. 
In November 2011 for example, Souad Abderrahim, Ennahda deputy in the Constitutional 
Assembly, called single mothers a “disgrace” and declared that they “do not have the right 
to exist.”12
While public and private discourses have strongly condemned and deplored sexuality outside 
of marriage, premarital sex has been quite widely practiced among Tunisian youth, at least 
partly in consequence of the postponing of the age of marriage. According to a national 
survey on sexuality carried out in 2009 by the ONFP and the Association tunisienne de lutte 
contre les maladies sexuellement transmissibles et le SIDA (ATL MST/SID),13 13.5 percent of 
girls and 52.5 percent of boys in the 15-24 age group have had at least one sexual intercourse. 
The ONFP survey revealed that the average age for the first sexual intercourse is 16.4 for 
girls and 17.4 for boys. The same survey also highlights that 60 percent of youth having 
had a sexual encounter did not use any type of contraceptive. Voluntary abortions among 
unmarried women are estimated at 2,500 per year since 2004, but this number should at 
least be multiplied by three, as many gynaecologists do not disclose the exact data to public 
authorities.14 Although a national programme on young people’s sexual and reproductive 
health was developed under Ben Ali, it had very minimal effects because it was limited to 
restricted categories and lacked programmes for sex education in schools (Khoury and Lopez 
2011:32).
Since the 2011 revolution, the problem of marriage postponement has become a public issue 
mostly on the initiative of Islamists, even if the debate has not yet translated into specific 
policies. The 2011 Ennahda programme has, in fact, underlined the necessity of adopting 
policies and taking measures to help young people to have a family, explicitly addressing the 
problem of delayed marriage.15 The issue was also raised by the party on several occasions. 
For example, in August 2014, in a recording broadcast on private radio station Mosaique FM 
12 The recording of the interview with Souad Abderrahim at Monte Carlo Doualya appears in Tuniscope, 9 
November 2011, http://www.tuniscope.com/article/10155/actualites/tunisie/souad-184612. However, the Ennahda 
party has not taken a common and clear position on the subject of single mothers.
13 Quoted in “Sexualité des jeunes tunisiens: Les comportements à risque explosent”, in Tunisia Today, 16 March 
2010, http://www.tunisia-today.com/?p=59034.
14 Ibid.
15 Point 205 of the 2011 Ennahda electoral programme. A French version is available at http://www.businessnews.
com.tn/pdf/programme-ennahdha0911.pdf.
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during the annual holiday commemorating the 1956 CPS, Rached Ghannouchi drew attention 
to the rise in age of first marriage, along with the imbalances in family life and the rising 
divorce rate. As a solution to these problems, Ghannouchi called on young men to marry 
divorcees and women over 30: “Today, 30, 35 and 40 is still young.”16
For their part, Salafist groups are instead promoting the spread of urfi marriages as a remedy 
to high wedding costs and premarital sex.17 Not requiring an official contract, nor parental 
consent, the purpose of this union is to secure the recognition of a couple before God, even 
though the marriage has no value in the eyes of the law. This custom was once particularly 
common in poorer segments of Tunisian society, but it is strictly forbidden by the CPS, and 
since the 1970s it has generally disappeared. After the uprising, urfi marriages have once 
again spread in poor neighbourhoods of Tunis, and it seems that they are also becoming 
more common on university campuses where Salafist groups are emerging.18 Through urfi 
marriages, young people are finding alternative ways to have “sanctioned” sex. These non-
conventional marriages, also called halal marriages, are considered legal by some from a 
religious point of view, even if they are not recognized by the state. However, the growth of 
urfi marriages poses particular problems related to family law and the economic welfare of 
women entering these relationships as well as the children that may be born to them (Dhillon 
and Yousef 2009:27).
3. YOUTH AND EMPLOYMENT
After a decade of structural adjustment policies, in the second half of the 1990s youth 
unemployment among graduates began to increase dramatically, while a large majority 
of Tunisian youth, particularly from poor and marginalized regions, were more and more 
forced to accept jobs in informal and illegal activities with no legal/social protection and with 
insecure/underpaid forms of labour (Elbaz 2009, Meddeb 2012).
While public authorities were seriously concerned with growing youth unemployment, they 
tried to minimize the problem in an attempt to sustain the official rhetoric of Tunisian economic 
miracle at the heart of the regime’s stability (Hibou 2006, Elbaz 2009). It is indicative of this 
attitude, for example, that the 10th Development Plan (2002-2006) optimistically claimed that 
the unemployment rate had experienced a decline from 15.6 percent in 1994 to 15 percent in 
2001 as a proof of the positive results of the employment policies pursued by the government 
(Tunisia 2002:88). Similarly, the 11th Development Plan (2007-2011) applauded the success of 
economic and social policies, announcing that unemployment had declined to 14.3 percent 
16 See “Ghannouchi to Tunisia youth: Marry divorcees and women over 30”, in Middle East Online, 14 August 2014, 
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=67599; AFP, “Tunisia Islamist chief urges men to wed women over 
30”, 13 August 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/tunisia-islamist-chief-urges-men-wed-women-over-235300476.html.
17 Urfi or common-law marriage is a “customary” Sunni Muslim marriage contract that is not registered with state 
authorities. This form of marriage does not require witnesses, but it is often performed before two witnesses. 
Nevertheless, the relationship is often kept secret from family members and community. When women become 
pregnant they are unable to prove they are married and it is not possible to get a divorce, because the marriage 
contract is not registered. For an analysis of the urfi marriage in Islamic law, and in particular of its spread in 
Egypt, see Paonessa (2012).
18 See Bensaied (2012), Baldé (2012), Tajine (2012), Belhassine (2013).
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in 2006 from 15.1 percent in 2001 (Tunisia 2007:14). Public authorities very seldom referred 
to the unemployment of graduates as a problem, preferring more neutral expressions such 
as “the question of the employment of graduates” (Hafaïedh 2000). Alongside enthusiastic 
claims, public authorities either avoided mentioning alarming data on youth unemployment 
or publicized lower figures.19 Data revealed after the 2011 uprising confirm that unemployment 
rates were kept artificially low by public authorities: in 1999 youth unemployment among 
graduates had reached a rate of 22.1 percent (versus the official rate of 4.7 percent), while 
in 2009 this figure had doubled to 44.9 percent (versus the official rate of 22.5 percent) 
(Haouari 2011).
Although the government was concealing the real figures, starting in the second half of 
the 1990s public action increasingly prioritized employment creation, as can be seen in the 
numerous initiatives and job creation programmes tailored to the educated unemployed. In 
1994, Ben Ali brought together more than 20 Conseils ministériels restreints (CMR) to review 
employment, youth and job training (Hibou 2006), and in his discourse on 7 November 1997 
announced the first National Conference on Employment (held in the summer of 1998). In 
2000, the urgency of job creation led to the creation of the Fonds national pour l’emploi (21-21 
from the bank account) whose main target was young people. The 10th and 11th Development 
Plans put employment as absolute priority to absorb the rising number of educated people 
entering the labour market. In early 2008, a Comité national d’organisation de la consultation 
nationale sur l’emploi, called for by Ben Ali in his discourse of 7 November 2007 and regrouping 
numerous experts, was formed to examine solutions to accelerate job creation in the country, 
particularly for graduates.
In spite of the numerous employment programmes established by public authorities, labour 
market problems among youth continuously and tremendously worsened in the 2000s. The 
neo-liberal model of development pursued under Ben Ali, which was presented as the natural 
response to the employment problems of the country, put employment flexibility and low-
cost labour at its core. Taking advantage of the vast and disposable reserve of unemployed 
youth, this model pushed many of them into precarious and insecure employment conditions. 
With the acceleration of Tunisia’s integration into the international market based on low-cost 
outsourcing in unskilled activities, young uneducated female workers from lower classes came 
to constitute the largest proportion of the workforce in export-oriented clothing industry and 
agriculture, at the expense of wage pressures and the security of working conditions. In the 
2000s, under pressure to bring labour costs down, the tourist industry, mainly dependent on 
foreign tour operators, and the off-shore regime in the service sector (particularly the call 
centres) became major sources of low-paid and precarious jobs for unemployed youth (Ben 
19 In 2004, for example, a report by the World Bank (2004) mentioned that the unemployment figures in the 
country had reached 37 percent for ages 15-17, 32 percent for ages 17-19, 29 percent for ages 20-24 and 22 percent 
for ages 20-29, soaring to 40 percent for graduates aged 20-24, but these figures were not circulated by Tunisian 
authorities (Hibou 2006:232). In the 11th Development Plan, there was no mention of the problems of “youth 
unemployment” and of “unemployment among graduates” (Tunisia 2007). Similarly, in September 2008, the 
Consultation nationale sur l’emploi (2008) published a diagnostic report on employment, claiming that young 
people (below 29 years) represented about 80 percent of all unemployed, that in certain regions unemployment 
among those aged 18-24 reached above 50 percent and that there was a strong gender gap. However, one month 
later, the official press publicizing the national conference on employment held at the end of the Consultation 
completely omitted any mention of these figures. See, as an example, Sellami (2008).
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Sedrine 2000, Meddeb 2010, Hibou et al 2011).
Neo-liberal policies also exacerbated inequalities, particularly between young people in 
poor, marginalized areas of the interior and those living in the big coastal cities, where the 
majority of job creation was concentrated. Export-oriented agricultural policies promoted in 
the interior regions led to marginalized local food-producing agriculture to the advantage 
of big farmers/agribusiness, thus largely contributing to the rural exodus of many young 
men. The latter offered a low-cost manpower on which firms on coastal cities could draw, 
increasing labour insecurity conditions (Ayeb 2011, Hibou et al 2011), while women, including 
young women, increasingly took the place of young men working on family farms and in agro-
business companies at very low wages.
The Gafsa Phosphate Company (GPC) in the southwest of Tunisia provides a good illustration 
of the dramatic impact of privatization policies on young people of the interior. Until 1975, 
the Company held control over the whole of social and economic life in Gafsa Governatorate 
(transportation, schools, electricity, and so on), and therefore was the major – and only – 
source of employment in the region. However, in the 20 years following its restructuring 
in 1985, 10,000 jobs were suppressed with dramatic effects on youth and job creation in 
the region (Allal 2010). The 2008 Gafsa revolt was sparked by the fraudulent recruitment 
procedure organized by the GPC of Gafsa in January 2008, which offered jobs to young 
candidates from outside the region to the disadvantage of the local population.
Public action worked to reduce the security of labour relations. To formalize labour flexibility, 
the regime adopted amendments to the Labour Code in 1994 and 1996 that ensured freedom 
of hiring and firing and allowed the use of fixed-term contracts (contrats à durée déterminée, 
CDD) and part-time work. Since then, various sources confirm that the proportion of fixed-term 
contracts has significantly increased, and they are now the most common type of contracts 
among young people (Meddeb 2010, Hibou et al 2011, World Bank 2014, Angel-Urdinola et al 
2015). Within the policy agenda endorsed by major international agencies to increase global 
employment flexibility (Sukarieh and Tannock 2008), in 2010 Tunisia also authorized private 
international placement agencies to operate in the country, thus contributing to the spread 
of temporary and seasonal labour migration programmes among educated youth (Fargues 
and Martin 2010).
The plethora of employment programmes implemented in the 1990s-2010s under Ben Ali were 
also functional to promote the neo-liberal free market model in various ways, contributing 
to exacerbating precariousness and insecurity among youth. They were based on two main 
pillars aimed at incorporating educated youth into the market economy and promoting a 
business-friendly agenda: a strong impetus to self-employment (through the use of micro-
credit loans, and other public incentives to youth entrepreneurship),20 and the improvement 
of the employability of graduates through training and professional internship programmes.21
20 This was mainly done through the Banque tunisienne de solidarité (1997). The 10th and 11th Development Plans 
stressed the importance of encouraging private initiative and self-employment (particularly among graduated 
people), giving a special role to micro-enterprise creation.
21 The first Professional Internship Programme was launched in 1987 (Stages d’initation à la vie professionnelle, 
SIVP) and was then followed by SIVP2 in 1993. After 2004, the government also launched PC5O (Prise en charge 
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These solutions were directly tied to the dominant official discourse that explained the rapid 
increase in unemployment among the educated labour force as simply resulting from the 
imbalance between the actual skills of graduates and the needs of the Tunisian labour market 
(World Bank 2008). This discourse completely omitted the structural factors behind the 
labour market problems of youth, and reflected the neo-liberal prescription “to help youth to 
help themselves, through providing them the skills of ‘employability’” (Sukarieh and Tannock 
2008:309).
In line with the neo-liberal discourse and the official rhetoric of the Tunisian miracle, the 
rising expansion of self-employment observed since the second half of the 1990s was thus 
portrayed as a signal that the employment and economic policies implemented by the 
government were successful in spreading the entrepreneur spirit (Tunisia 2002:34), missing 
the point that most “entrepreneurship activities” led by young people generate low incomes, 
are not covered by health insurance and operate in the informal economy.
Moreover, these employment programmes failed to provide long-term, stable and sustainable 
solutions to youth unemployment, and were biased against the regions of the interior. Training 
and professional internship programmes paid young people wages below the minimum 
wage and had very low rates of job insertion after programme completion. The contracts, 
which lasted for a short-term period (from 6 to 12 months), could be terminated unilaterally 
at any time and were seldom transformed into long-term contracts.22 Regarding micro-
credit loans and the promotion of self-employment, these initiatives mostly generated low 
profits and remained in the informal economy, thus failing to create business activities that 
were financially sustainable over time. Yet, all these programmes were accessible through 
clientelist practices under the control of the regime party, the RCD (Allal 2010, Catusse et al 
2010, Destremau 2010, Hibou et al 2011).
The post-uprising period has generated a reframing of the discourse on youth and employment. 
While job creation for youth, particularly in marginalized regions, has continued to be claimed 
as the major policy priority by all governments and political forces,23 the category of “youth 
as a problem” has been extended to include not only the educated unemployed, but also 
young people working under precarious conditions with temporary and seasonal contracts 
(World Bank 2014, Angel-Urdinola et al 2015, ILO and Minister of Employment 2014), and the 
so-called NEETs, namely discouraged young people who are not in education, employment or 
training (World Bank 2014). It may be indicative of this changing discourse that a recent World 
Bank publication on Tunisia was entitled “Labor Policy to Promote Good Jobs in Tunisia” 
(Angel-Urdinola et al 2015). Similarly, a report jointly published by the ILO and the Minister 
of Employment argued that it does not suffice that a young person gets his/her first job to 
transit to active life, but this job must satisfy the criteria of decent work, namely personal 
satisfaction and permanent employment (ILO and Minister of Employment 2014).
par l’Etat de 50 pourcent des salaires versés) and PC75. In 2009, after a reorganization of the employment 
schemes, main internship programmes were: the Labour Market Access and Employability Programme (CAIP) 
for graduates and non-graduates; the Voluntary Civil Service (SCV) that subsidized the costs of hiring university 
graduates in civil society organizations; the Employment Programme for Graduates of Higher Education (CIDES) 
and the Youth Back-to-Work Programme.
22 See Ben Sedrine (2000), Barrouhi (2006).
23 See, for example, the electoral programmes of Ennahda (2011, 2014) and Nida Tounes (2014).
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In spite of this changing discourse, however, the post-uprising analytical and policy framework 
appears to be in strong continuity with the past, remaining firmly based on the neo-liberal 
agenda. The Deauville partnership, as well as the loan agreement finalized with the IMF in 
May 2013, essentially commit Tunisia to pursue, and even push forward, the same economic 
policies as in Ben Ali’s regime. Rather than rethinking the Tunisian development model, the 
Jebali, Larayedh and Essid governments have thus confirmed their full support for a free 
market economy.
The education gap rhetoric remains central to explain “youth exclusion” from the Tunisian 
labour market. For educated youth, like in the past, the problem primarily lies in the mismatch 
between the competencies required by the labour market and what young people study in 
higher education (World Bank 2014). Similarly, low education in rural areas is presented as 
the key driver of labour market informality among youth (World Bank 2014, ILO and Minister 
of Employment 2014). Although there is a general recognition about the predominance of 
youth employment in the informal sector, the prevailing reading is that job informality is 
driven by inflexible labour regulations, associated with open-ended contracts, high income 
taxes on wages and the social security contribution (World Bank 2014). A positive view 
prevails with regard to self-employment and entrepreneurship, which continue to be invoked 
by political parties and international agencies as the main solution to youth unemployment.24 
In fact, instead of questioning the past economic policies, public authorities and international 
agencies share the view that the major problem with previous employment projects, including 
entrepreneurship promotion programmes – alongside the fragmentation of interventions – is 
their focus on university graduates in coastal/industrial regions, and therefore the exclusion 
of disadvantaged youth without a secondary education (see World Bank 2014, ILO and Minister 
of Employment 2014).
As a result, post-uprising governments have responded to youth unemployment with the same 
employment programmes as in Ben Ali’s era.25 There has been an intensification of professional 
training programmes aimed at responding to employer demands and labour market needs,26 
as well as youth entrepreneurship programmes that have now been extended to marginalized 
regions.27 As public resources in Tunisia are under stress, most of these programmes appear 
24 See World Bank (2014) and the electoral programmes by Nida Tounes (2014) and Ennahda (2011, 2014).
25 See, for example, the five priorities set by the new government during its first 100 days with regard to job 
creation: “Rencontre avec la presse autour des 5 priorités du ministère de l’Emploi”, in DirectInfo, 6 April 2015, 
http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/?p=226959; “Lancement du programme chèque emploi”, in DirectInfo, 
26 December 2014, http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/?p=205065.
26 See the AMAL programme, established under the first Ghannouchi government and renewed under the Jebali 
government, which took inspiration from a previous programme implemented under Ben Ali; the Programme 
d’encouragement à l’emploi launched in August 2012; the programme “chèque d’amélioration de l’employabilité” 
on December 2014 (“Lancement du programme chèque emploi”, in DirectInfo, 26 December 2014, http://directinfo.
webmanagercenter.com/?p=205065); the PEJTUN project “Emplois décents pour la jeunesse tunisienne” signed 
in May 2015 between Tunisia and ILO.
27 See Intilak started in October 2011; the national programme for micro-project financing in November 2012; 
the Fonds d’amitié tuniso-qatari launched in 2013; the programme Fonds d’accompagnement et de financement 
des PME in 12 governatorates including Médenine, Tataouine, Gabes, Kébili, Tozeur, Gafsa, Kasserine, SidiBouzid, 
Kairouan, le Kef, Siliana and Jendouba launched in May 2015; the project in Medenine and Tataouine (see 
“Programme suisse à la BFME: Lancement de 100 projets et création de 800 emplois”, in DirectInfo, 28 May 2015, 
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to be largely financed and promoted by joint efforts of international and private regional 
actors. It is worth mentioning the growing role played by Qatar-based organizations such as 
the Fonds d’amitié tuniso-qatari, which was launched in 2013, and Silatech, which, in addition 
to financing numerous youth entrepreneurship programmes in Tunisia and throughout the 
Arab world, also offered generous financial support for the preparation of the Word Bank’s 
2014 report on Tunisian youth.
4. YOUTH AND MIGRATION
As labour market conditions have deteriorated since the mid-1990s, the share of young 
Tunisians that have intentions to leave the country has dramatically increased. The desire 
among Tunisian youth to emigrate permanently seems to be the highest in the region (Silatech 
2010:211, Khoury and Lopez 2011:36). Migration affects both real life and the imaginary of 
young people in Tunisia. Consequently, in the public discourse, the category of youth is strictly 
associated to the migration phenomenon.
Motivations to migrate are strongly determined by gender, and the majority of migrants are 
young men (ILO 2013, Institut national de la statistique 2013).28 Employment is the main 
driver for both men and women, but at very different levels: 85.6 percent of men and 38.4 
percent of women migrate in search of better employment perspectives. For 36.3 percent of 
women, family reasons (reunification and marriage) trigger migration, while this is the case 
for only 3.8 percent of men. Educational purposes apply to 16.9 percent of women and only 5 
percent of men (ILO 2013).
Under Ben Ali, migration was a strategic axis of Tunisian public action to cope with the 
failure of the country’s economic model and the consequent growth in youth unemployment, 
although officially this strategy was followed in a discreet and ambiguous manner (Hibou et 
al 2011).29 If, until the early 2000s, the migration issue was openly addressed within national 
economic plans, as it was in the 10th Development Plan (2002-2007), then the migration 
of educated Tunisians was no longer presented, at least publically, as a tool for coping with 
employment problems.30 As a security-based approach to migration became a priority in Euro-
Mediterranean relations from the end of the 1990s, the Tunisian official discourse and policies 
changed drastically, particularly with regard to illegal migration. Migration policies in Tunisia 
started being characterized by the fight against irregular migrations as required by the EU 
and its member states. With the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (alias Barcelona Process), 
launched in 1995, economic cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean 
became strictly linked to the involvement of governments of third Mediterranean countries in 
controlling illegal migration (Pepicelli 2004). Co-operation and assistance became subjected 
to the conditionality of “good” co-operation with EU in terms of border controls and migration 
flow monitoring.
http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/?p=238494).
28 Migrant women are still a minority compared to men. However, the percentage of Tunisian women who prefer to 
migrate is considered the highest in the Arab world. See Silatech (2010:212).
29 Irregular migrations were in fact punished by national laws approved in the 1960s and 1970s.
30 See, for example, the 11th Development Plan (Tunisia 2007).
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From the late 1990s and early 2000s, in order to foster its international recognition as “a 
privileged partner” or “bon élève” (Hibou et al 2011:76), Tunisia signed several bilateral 
and multilateral agreements with Southern European countries and the EU concerning 
border controls, entry and readmission of Tunisian nationals and third-country nationals. 
On 3 February 2004, three months after its Moroccan neighbour and two months after 
promulgating a new law to combat terrorism, Tunisia reformed its migration law, reinforcing 
penal sentences against irregular migration.
The reinforcement of border controls by the Tunisian government and the 2004 migration 
law were instrumental not only to show compliance with EU expectations, but also to allow the 
regime to strengthen its control over society at large and youth in particular, the latter forming 
the majority of actual and potential migrants. Negating the delivery or renewal of passports 
to Tunisians who were not members of the ruling party, or were suspected of opposing the 
regime, was aimed at discouraging social protests, particularly among unemployed youth 
in poor marginalized regions (Cassarino 2014:105). Given the discretionary power of the 
judiciary and the ambivalence of the 2004 migration law, those left behind could also be 
easily accused of “participating in” or “preparing for” illegal border crossings if they were not 
acquiescent to the regime (Cassarino 2014:106).
Moreover, while vis-à-vis the EU (in official talks and negotiations) the Ben Ali regime showed 
itself to be taking seriously the fight against unauthorized migration, domestically “illegal 
migration” was seldom portrayed as a major security issue, continuing to be tolerated as 
safety valve for youth unemployment (Cassarino 2014:107). At the end of the 2000s, it 
became clear that migration policies based on the attempt at organizing legal migration in 
exchange of Tunisia’s commitment to struggle against illegal migration were not producing 
the expected results. With the acceleration of neo-liberal policies, illegal migration did not 
decrease at all and the brain drain of educated youth coming from the middle and upper class 
continued to increase (Ben Romdhane 2011:168), while the percentage of unemployed and 
inactive youth in the country continued to grow (Hibou et al 2011).
The fall of the Ben Ali regime in January 2011 represented, at least at the beginning, a turning 
point in the migration policies and in the management of migration flows. In the absence of 
domestic security controls at borders, an unprecedented outflow of Tunisian migrants tried 
to reach Europe. In less than three months (January-March 2011), 20,258 Tunisians arrived 
on the Italian island of Lampedusa (Frontex 2011:29, Boubakri 2013:5). Huge flows continued 
even during the following months, doubling the average presence of Tunisian migrants on 
Italian shores. It is estimated that more than 40,000 of the 51,000 Tunisians who emigrated 
abroad between May 2011 and May 2012 were young and mostly male (IOM 2014). In the 
attempt to escape from Tunisia, hundreds of migrants disappeared in the Mediterranean Sea. 
As a consequence, one of the first issues faced by the post-Ben Ali government was to deal 
with the still open dossier of the “missing migrants” lost during sea crossings between March 
and May 2011 (Smith 2012).
In the first months after the revolts, a new discourse on migration emerged, and in 2011 
the position of State Secretary for Immigration and Tunisians Residing Abroad was created 
under the Ministry for Social Affairs, in charge of coordinating the governmental structures 
responsible for migration and building a comprehensive political strategy in order to integrate 
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migration in development strategies of Tunisia. Part of this new strategy towards migration 
was aimed at strengthening the link with the Tunisian diaspora, and thus political participation 
of Tunisian residents abroad became a priority. For the first time in the history of Tunisia, 
out of the 217 National Constituent Assembly members, 18 MPs were elected to represent 
the Tunisian diaspora. Some of these elected members had migrated with their parents at 
a young age and had grown up abroad, mostly in Europe (see the case of Italy and France). 
Moreover the creation of the Haut conseil des tunisiens à l’étranger was also planned, to 
sustain links with Tunisian expatriates and to ensure that the new government would take 
into consideration the demands and aspirations of its children abroad; but it has not yet been 
established.
Thus, the new discourse on migration in the post-revolutionary Tunisia focused on two main 
goals: on one side strengthening the link with Tunisian citizens living in European countries, 
and on the other transcending a security-based perspective in the management of irregular 
emigration in favour of a human-rights-based policy. The new political parties openly criticized 
both the role of “guardian” of European borders imposed by the EU and the double standards 
of EU in dealing with the concept of human rights. “We do not have to be soldiers or policemen 
of Europe. This role-play should be stopped,” said a member of the Democratic Pole (Boubakri 
2013:19). Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of Ennahda, in December 2012 stated: “We say to 
Europe that illegal immigration will no longer bother you. We will no longer give you our 
graduates as a gift. Tunisia needs all its sons and, in a few years, it will be a country which 
attracts talent rather than turning talent away.”31
However, four years after the regime change, the security-based approach continues to be 
dominant, as required by the new European migration policy project, the Mobility Partnership.32 
Indeed, although the 2014 Constitution guarantees the right for “every citizen” to leave the 
country (Article 24) and to return (Article 25), the current legal provisions constrain this 
right and criminalize “irregular exit” and subsequent return of Tunisian nationals. Moreover, 
while the tone of criticism towards European migration policies by political parties in power 
has become weaker, the issue of migration has not been central in the internal political 
programmes and activities.33 At the same time, campaigns to advise youth against illegal 
migration that are mainly funded by international organizations, such as the IOM project 
Salemm (Solidarity with the children from Maghreb and Mashreq), are gaining a certain 
visibility (Sayadi 2014). Illegal migrations – although there is no reliable data – are in fact 
characterized by a very high percentage of young and single men under 30, who have low 
education levels (not above secondary school)34 and are unemployed, coming from the low-
middle class (ILO 2013).
31 Quoted in Boubakri (2013:19). See, for example, Chennoufi (2011).
32 European Commission, EU and Tunisia establish their Mobility Partnership, 3 March 2014, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-14-208_en.htm.
33 For example, despite the requests of NGOs and civil society, a ministry to deal with the migration issue has not 
been created, only the position of State Secretary for Immigration under the Ministry for Social Affairs, which was 
reconfirmed even in the Essid government (2015). See Ferchichi (2015).
34 However, it should be underlined that the new generation of Tunisian migrants show higher education levels 
than the previous generation, in which 85 percent had primary school education. More than half of migrants today 
have achieved secondary education or more, and among them 15 percent have a university degree (ILO 2013).
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5. YOUTH AND SPATIAL PLANNING
Tunisia is a country of great spatial inequalities. Probably the most well-known of such 
inequalities is the regional imbalance between the big cities of the coastal area and the mainly 
agricultural regions of the interior. But also within the mainly urban and most dynamic region 
of the coast, there are fundamental inequalities between the popular and largely “informal” 
urban and suburban areas and the middle to upper class neighbourhoods. Spatial inequalities 
affect the life of youth and youth transition to adulthood in many ways as they imply great 
differences in access to and quality of public services, employment and housing, as well as 
in patterns of mobility. Inasmuch as the place of residence is also associated to different and 
gendered patterns of youth leisure and sport activities – as witnessed, for instance, by the 
many accounts of “Western style” cafes and other leisure places where upper-middle class girls 
can easily spend time by themselves or with their friends – and, by contrast, the exclusively 
male milieu of “Arab” cafes in lower class neighbourhoods where unemployed boys spend 
their days away from overcrowded parent homes while waiting to migrate (Sebastiani 2014). 
In sum, the experience of being young is deeply affected by the region and/or neighbourhood 
one is born into.
Tunisian regional inequalities – a heritage of colonial times, only partially addressed after 
independence35 – were greatly exacerbated by Tunisia’s gradual insertion in the neo-liberal 
global economy that further concentrated economic, political, administrative and cultural 
power in the coastal cities, while increasingly delegating local development to market forces.
At least since the 90s, in fact, Tunisian spatial planning policies have aimed at promoting 
a selective and differentiated development directed at improving the productivity and 
competitiveness of those regions offering comparative advantages with respect to the global 
market.36
The “underdevelopment” of the interior regions was acknowledged by the Ben Ali regime, 
although – in line with the myth of a Tunisian “economic miracle” – it was presented as a residual 
consequence of the development process and largely underestimated. The assessment of the 
developmental deficits in these regions was made on reductive criteria, namely access to 
water and electricity or need for better connection with the country’s road networks (Hibou 
et al 2011:39). In official documents, the mantra was the promotion of economic growth by a 
competitive insertion into the global market, while at the same time preserving a minimum 
of spatial and social cohesion through alleviating the most perverse consequences of the 
pursuit of the first objective. Regional development programmes were thus implemented 
starting in the 90s. The main vehicles for regional “development” were for instance the 
already mentioned poverty-alleviating programmes directed towards the “zones d’ombre” 
(dark zones), such as the 26-26 and the Employment Fund 21-21, the latter aimed at educated 
youth in underdeveloped regions. These solidarity funds collected “private” donations 
to be distributed to a selected number of beneficiaries on the basis of political loyalty or 
connections, thus extending the regime’s political control through patrimonial distribution of 
35 For more details on the post-independence spatial planning approaches, see Ben Letaief (2008), Dhaher (2010), 
Belhedi (2011).
36 See, for example, the 11th Development Plan, 2007-2011 (Tunisia 2007).
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small benefits to a selected number of individuals in areas in which the state had in practice 
fully disengaged from a social and developmental role.
The same necessity of social and political control in the framework of neo-liberal policies 
and state disengagement as a services provider guided the regime’s urban policies under 
Ben Ali. Today, a near-majority of urban households cannot afford to purchase a modest 
housing unit, a problem that is likely to worsen due to rising housing costs and increasing 
land scarcity, while informal housing continues to expand (UN Habitat 2011). Housing costs 
coupled with employment problems greatly affect the youth of middle to lower social strata, 
leading to a delay in marriage and late cohabitation of parents with their children, creating 
intergenerational tensions and complicating the transition to adulthood.
The dimension of the problem was minimized under the Ben Ali regime, and Tunisia was 
presented as a positive example of successful housing policies and urban planning (compared 
to other countries in the region). Official data pointed to more than 80 percent of households 
owning their house, and to a residual number of households without services such as water, 
electricity and sanitation (Chabbi 2012).
Massive urbanization and the overextension of the great Tunis urban area have been mainly 
presented as determined by the rural exodus and by the demographic transition.37 At a 
closer look, however, urban disparities do not seem to be the product only of residual factors 
associated with the development process. Rather, they are mainly produced by the increased 
reliance on market forces in urban planning, by selective housing policies that were aimed at 
the middle salaried class while neglecting lower social strata and by the tolerating attitude of 
the state with respect to informal or illegal solutions to rising housing costs.
Since the 70s, in fact, housing policies have produced an urban exodus from the overcrowded 
city centre to the periphery and the sub-periphery, with the consequence of greatly enlarging 
the urban space and reducing the population density.38 The lower social strata excluded from 
public housing policies found “spontaneous” private solutions in what came to be known 
as habitat spontané péri-urbain (suburban informal housing). Suburban informal housing 
is made of brick and cement, rather than adobe and makeshift materials. However, it still 
represents a form of urban marginalization without any urban development planning and 
services. Furthermore, the urban overextension caused other problems, such as increasing 
the distance from home to workplace, limiting access to the city centre for the affected 
population and creating urban ghettos.
Again with the aim of mitigating the most perverse effect of urban marginalization, in 1991-92 
the regime launched a National Programme for the Rehabilitation of Poor Neighbourhoods 
37 According to official data, in fact, as highlighted by Chabbi (2012:5), both rural exodus and demographic growth 
have been substantially reduced since the 1980s-1990s. Great urbanization mainly provoked by the rural exodus 
was a phenomenon of the 1960s that lasted until the early 70s as witnessed by the “gourbivilles” and by the 
growing urban population density in that period (Ben Letaief 2008, Dhaher 2010, Chabbi 2012).
38 At the beginning of the 1970s, different housing policy tools were created, such as the Agence foncière d’habitat 
and the Caisse national d’épargne-logement aimed at building residential areas for the middle class with facilitated 
access to credit. Tunis went from 110 inhabitants per hectare in 1970 to 85, 15 years later (Chabbi 2012:18).
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(Programme national de réhabilitation des quartiers populaires, PNRQP).39 The programme 
covered road, sanitation and house improvements (but not urban development). A conspicuous 
amount of public resources was involved in the rehabilitation project (Chabbi 2012), also 
with the aim of contrasting deviant behaviour among youth associated with marginalization 
(delinquency, drug abuse and religious extremism). The effects in terms of improving the 
living conditions of the population were unimpressive and the programme led to corruption 
and speculation on the land to be covered by the national programme, as well as to the 
creation of more illegal settlements (Chabbi 2012).
As in other domains of public action, the main aim of the urban rehabilitation projects – which 
at best were palliative measures to the most extreme situations – was in fact the reinforcement 
of public control through co-opting measures. The informality of popular neighbourhoods and 
the nearly complete absence of the welfare and development state did not imply the absence 
of the political hand of the regime. Informal neighbourhoods never lacked the presence of 
local offices of the regime party or local administrators acting as mediators between the 
inhabitants and the political apparatus (Legros 2005:98).
Tunisian spatial inequalities came to the spotlight thanks to the popular revolts of 2010-11 
that originated precisely – as other protest cycles before them – from the poorest interior 
regions before reaching the capital (Ayeb 2011). Following the revolts, the discourse on spatial 
inequalities as the main driver of revolts became mainstream in the public debate and in 
the broader production of knowledge. The “revolution” was also unanimously proclaimed 
as a youth-led re-appropriation of the public space. Many accounts of the days of the 
revolution underlined both a re-appropriation of the public sphere with the end of “fear”, 
which permeated the life of ordinary Tunisian citizens under Ben Ali (Hibou 2011), and also 
the feeling of unity and equality in the liberating side-by-side presence in the street of people 
from different backgrounds converging in the central boulevards of Tunis from the poor 
interior region, informal and popular urban areas and upper-middle-class neighbourhoods.
As the revolutionary momentum of the first months gradually fatigued, people slowly 
discovered that inequalities and misunderstandings where still there, rooted as they are in 
resilient power relations. Public discourse once again put forward the narrative of youth in 
marginalized areas as a breeding ground for all sorts of extremist behaviour and deviance, as 
the heroes of the revolution – unemployed youth – turned again into thugs (Allal 2011).
This notwithstanding, faithful to the general revolutionary discourse, spatial disparities 
are at the top of the agenda for the main political parties, without any major difference in 
approach. The post-revolution Constitution enshrines the state’s commitment to sustainable 
development and regional equity (Articles 12 and 129), and even guarantees the allocation 
of Tunisian natural resources to advance this aim (Article 136). President Essebsi, elected in 
2014, has vowed to address economic problems to “realize the promises of the revolution: 
dignity, employment, health and regional equality.”
39 In fact, already in 1981 the Urban Rehabilitation and Renovation Agency (Agence de réhabilitation et de 
rénovation urbaine, ARRU) had been set up with the aim of providing services to poor urban areas in various 
parts of the country, also following the crisis provoked by the 1978-79 wave of protest.
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The public discourse, however, has not yet translated into any concrete policy change, while the 
uncertainty of the transition phase further worsened socio-economic conditions, especially 
in underdeveloped areas. Also, owning to lack of government control, there has been an 
augmentation of illegal settlements (Chabbi 2012). Supposedly, a new housing strategy is to 
be launched after a period of consultation, as recently announced by public authorities,40 but 
the post-revolutionary measures seem dangerously similar to the pre-revolutionary ones.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis of the four selected domains of public action reveals common patterns of policies 
and concerns when dealing with youth.
The main determinant of changing socio-economic conditions for the entire population (as 
well as for youth) has been, since the late 80s, neo-liberal macroeconomic policies. In this 
context, the state has increasingly renounced its social regulating functions in many different 
aspects of citizens’ life, including transition from childhood to adulthood, which was gradually 
left to market forces at the cost of rising inequalities and social conflict as an increasing 
number of youth could not follow the normatively prescribed path traced by the previous 
generation, such as finding a decent job, having a home and starting a family. Unsupervised 
and “lost-in-transition” youth then started to represent a threat to social order in the eyes 
of the regime, which reacted with a mixed set of policies aimed at concealing the problem, 
somehow mitigating it and, most of all, at controlling the “excluded” through a mix of co-
optation measures and repression. At the same time, the regime had a tolerating attitude 
towards informal and illegal activities such as informal black-market jobs, informal housing, 
illegal migration and so on, which acted as a relief valve to youth social malaise.
Since the 2011 “revolution”, the unanimous adoption – by the different transition governments, 
the main institutional political parties and international agencies – of youth as the most 
relevant analytical framework for the diagnosis of Tunisia’s social and economic problems, has 
had the effect of obscuring and undermining alternative analytical frames such as class, thus 
downplaying broader (and potentially disruptive) social and economic conflicts. This is quite 
evident in official documents and policy literature in which the concept of “youth exclusion” 
is completely detached from a systemic analysis of the interplay between class, status and 
political power. As the pre-revolutionary, neo-liberal system is not questioned at the official 
level, policies of “youth inclusion” focus almost exclusively on education, formal and informal 
training and generally expanding youth skills to integrate youth into the market-regulated 
system. Under these conditions, “youth inclusion” could – if and when successful – represent 
for many youth integration in the current market-regulated system under conditions of 
exploitation. In this sense, it is precisely through the category of youth that normative ideas 
about duties and rights from the previous welfare and development state era are continuing 
to be renegotiated with the entire population.
40 See the document for a new housing strategy (Nouvelle stratégie de l’habitat 2014) on the Ministry website, 
http://www.mehat.gov.tn/index.php?id=330&L=1.
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